Of all the speculations which we have noticed of the probable course of the Administration towards the secessionists, there is not one of them that appears to us to coincide with the President’s Inaugural. As we understand the President he will not surrender or evacuate the Southern forts and possessions of the United States, till he is forced to do so, if such be in the power of the secessionists or till Congress direct that it be done as a means to restore peace.

Were the Administration to evacuate the forts in the seceded States, it would amount to a recognition of their separation from and independence of the other States, an act which it is not at all likely Mr. Lincoln or his advisers will be in haste to perform.

The Policy of the Administration, as we understand the Inaugural, will be to act on the defensive, but at the same time so shape its course as to compel the seceded States to perform such acts of aggression or offense as should be resisted. Thus would the cause of war be cast upon the seceders, and whatever course the Administration might take in repelling and chastising the aggression which it would provoke, it would justify by the circumstances under which it would assume to have acted and rely upon the country to sustain it not only in defensive acts but in punishing to whatever extent it might be sustained in doing so, the alleged rebels and traitors.

This course would not be called coercive towards the seceders. It would be claimed to be self-defensive, no matter to what ever lengths it might be carried afterwards.

The evacuation of fortified places and the surrender of public property are the last acts of belligerents, and they are generally performed subsequently, and but seldom previous to the ratification of a treaty of peace, or the performance of some act by the belligerents which is regarded as tantamount to a cessation of hostilities between them.

There is no reason to infer that the Administration will depart from this universally practiced rule among belligerents in its intercourse with the seceded States. If it be the design of the Administration to recognize the existence and independence of the Confederated States of the South, it will scarcely do so by the indirect means of evacuating the forts and surrendering the property still in the possession of the Federal forces. To do so would be giving an advantage to the Southern confederates, in any future negotiations between them and the Federal Government which it would be neither the inclination, the wish or policy of Mr. Lincoln and his friends to concede, and for which he and his advisers would be held uncomfortably accountable. If it must be so, let the Confederate States be recognized and treated to all intents and purposes as a foreign State, yielding to them whatever justice and reason seem to demand, but with[h]olding from them such means as might enable them to take undue advantage of the Federal Government in such international negotiations as would of course have to be entered into between the two Governments. The Federal Government should not place itself at the mercy or good will of the new Government no more than it would in that of any other foreign government, and hence it should not weaken its means nor lessen its resources for making the best possible international treaty for its future interests with the Confederate States.

Mr. Lincoln and his advisers would not be guilty of such an indiscretion, to say the least of it, as to evacuate forts and surrender public property to a foreign government, before concluding with it such treaties as he could procure for the advantage of his country.

We have said enough to show that there is good reason to believe that Mr. Lincoln will not withdraw the Federal forces from the Government Forts and other posts in its occupancy, and we shall not believe any rumor to the contrary till we be convinced beyond question that the forces are withdrawn.