Editor’s note. The Professional Division of the AHA, with the agreement of the AHA Executive Committee, has recommended publication of the exchange below. Professor Turner’s letter and supporting documents had earlier been refused publication and carries its original date.
March 21, 1985
To the Editor:
As statements by other historians impugning my part in the David Abraham case have appeared in such widely read publications as the New York Times, the International Herald Tribune, Time, the Chronicle of Higher Education, and The Nation, I think it appropriate to make a statement in this professional newsletter. The Nation of February 26, 1985, printed a 1983 letter to me from Arno Mayer of Princeton in which he accused me of McCarthyism for challenging his colleague Abraham’s scholarship. A statement attributed to Natalie Zemon Davis of Princeton in that same issue echoes that charge. Lawrence Stone of Princeton is quoted there as having called the Abraham case a “witch hunt.” The author of The Nation article, Jon Wiener of the University of California, Irvine, wrote: “Two senior historians, one at Yale University and one at the University of California, Berkeley, have devoted their time and professional reputations over the past year to destroying the career of a young Marxist historian, David Abraham.” According to Wiener, Robert Tignor, chairman of the Princeton history department, has stated that for young scholars the case means: “Don’t tread on the toes of established historians. Stay away from controversy. Don’t take chances. The history profession is a sea full of sharks.”
These allegations of political persecution and abuse of a junior historian have obscured the source of the Abraham case: his 1981 Princeton Press book, The Collapse of the Weimar Republic. Abraham and his defenders admit that the book contains many inaccuracies but claim that nothing more is involved than mistakes of the sort that slip by even the finest of historians now and then. These mistakes, they claim, reveal no tendentiousness and could be corrected without altering Abraham’s findings.
After great delay occasioned by the slowness with which scholarly journals are published, those who are sufficiently interested can now read detailed analyses of Abraham’s methods in dealing with evidence.* That requires, however, a strong command of German, since the documentation is in that language. So that those without the time or necessary linguistic background can judge for themselves, I provide here, with the language problem removed, one among many dozens of possible examples.
Below is a passage from Abraham’s book in which he makes use of three letters exchanged in 1932 by industrialist Paul Reusch and Hjalmar Schacht, former president of the Reichsbank who would soon resume that post under Hitler. Following that passage are English translations of those letters provided by Ruth Hein, an internationally recognized professional translator of German literature. In his 1983 letter to me now printed in The Nation, Arno Mayer said of these letters: “After reading, interpreting, and contextualizing the three documents you enclose with your letter to me, I am inclined to think that David Abraham actually understates his case.”
I urge all those interested in upholding the most rudimentary standards of our profession to compare for themselves Abraham’s versions of the three documents with their actual contents.
Henry A. Turner Jr.
Yale University
*Analysis by Gerald D. Feldman and response by Abraham, Central European History XVII (June 1984); Ulrich Nocken, “‘Weimarer Geschichte(n). Zum neuen amerikanischen Buch ‘The Collapse of the Weimar Republic,'” Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial– und Wirtschaftsgeschichte LXXI (December 1984).
David Abraham, The Collapse of the Weimar Republic, p. 320:
By early 1932 at the latest, the leading figures in the now decisive fraction of industry concluded that Nazi participation in or control of the government would provide the best way out of the political crisis while providing auspicious possibilities for a profitable economic recovery. Such a decision was, of course, primarily opportunist and contributed little—beside funding—to Nazi electoral and popular successes. Conversely, however, electoral successes alone could not guarantee that the Nazis would come to power, and the support of numerous industrialists, bankers, estate owners, and army officers proved crucial to such an outcome. The following exchange between Schacht and Reusch was characteristic:
The Nazis are not to be circumvented; more than that, they are the positive force. We should contribute to them and their efforts and assist them in altering some of the utopian aspects of their economic policies. [Schacht]
After a productive two-hour talk with Hitler yesterday, I fully and completely agree with your suggestion. . . . I find myself in complete sympathy with the National Socialists, though they are a bit tactless. [Reusch]
[I have begun] a collection for the purpose of supporting them and enlightening them on economic issues. [Schacht]126
126 Schacht to Reusch, 18 Mar. 1932; Reusch’s response, 20 Mar. 1932; and Schacht’s announcement of 6 June 1932; all in HA GHH/Nachlass Reusch 400 101 290/33a.
March 18, 1932
Dear Herr Reusch:
The election outcome of March 13 will not have deceived you about the fact that the rightward political shift in Germany continues unabated and that, given such a rightward shift, the National Socialist party is not to be circumvented. All of us are concerned in that regard about the question of National Socialist economic policy. Previously, I had not panicularly applied myself to this problem, but I think it necessary that something be done, on the part of responsible people in the business community, to prevent mischief. The hope that Herr Hugenberg will gain influence on the Nazis appears to have become doubtful in light of the latest developments.
I am therefore wondering whether the attempt to influence National Socialist ideas in a reasonable sense should not be undertaken from another quarter. Briefly my suggestion takes the following form: I would like to engage, initially for two years or so, a man exceptionally well versed in financial and economic policy and approved by me who will establish contact with Hitler’s economic policy organizations in order to work through and shape the problems with those gentlemen so that an economic program will result for the National Socialist party which industry and commerce can go along with. I believe success is possible. If it should not come about, commerce and industry would have learned where matters stand.
I write to you about this for two reasons, to find out, first, whether you approve of the idea and, second, whether it would be possible to raise the few thousand marks it would cost. I estimate the cost at the quite low level of 12,000 marks for an annual honorarium for the man to be engaged and about 3,000 marks for the yearly expenses. That would amount to 15,000 marks a year, which would probably have to be guaranteed for two years. I myself am ready to participate by contributing a tenth of the financial costs.
I look forward to hearing from you and hope that you had a successful day in Basel.
With best regards,
Yours sincerely,
Hjalmar Schacht
Munich, March 2o, 1932
Dear Herr Schacht:
Reply to your letter of March 18, 1932
I agree completely with your suggestion and am convinced that in spite of the hard times, there will be no difficulty in raising the sum you propose for the task in question. Yesterday l had a two-hour conversation with Hitler here in Munich, in which, among other things, I presented him with similar thoughts. In that conversation I expressed to him the view that he needs first-class experts not only for economic policy but also for financial, foreign, and domestic policies, who alone should be assigned the task of working out tightly structured programs. In selecting these men, the question of whether they are members of the National Socialist party should count for far less than their professional and practical aptitude, which is much more important. Hitler agreed with this last thought.
I have communicated the contents of your letter to Herrn Springorum, who will, I am convinced, also participate.
On April 5 and 6 I expect to be in Berlin and would be pleased if we could meet at a time to be agreed upon.
The Basel meeting was completely overshadowed by the death of Ivar Kreuger, Montague Norman had planned to make various proposals at the meeting of the administrative council but desisted because of the effect of Kreuger’s death, so that the session achieved nothing notable.
With best regards,
Yours,
Paul Reusch
June 6, 1932
Dear Herr Reusch:
I confirm herewith for the record our previous consultations, in order, among others, to enable you to discuss details with your friends.
To work through our problems regarding policies affecting financial and credit matters so that swift measures will be possible in the event of a re-ordering our governmental relations, several friends from the German business community are joining together to set up a temporary office which will systematically gather material and work it through in such manner as to take business interests into consideration. This office is conceived of as a confidential operation of modest proportions over whose work this writer will exercise supervision and for whose financing he will account to the participants. Each participant, including this writer, obligates himself to a one-time contribution of 3,000 marks. Initially, the results will be accessible only to the participants. They will jointly decide on further use.
It is additionally intended to maintain contact with two men commissioned by Herr Adolf Hitler (Wilhelm Keppler and Leopold Plaichinger) in order to insure, wherever possible, that the economic-policy concepts which come to expression in the office arc in accord with the views held among National Socialists, since the National Socialist party will. in all likelihood, exercise a decisive influence in the shaping of things to come.
On the basis of our consultation, I have secured the services of Dr. Karl Krämer, previously with the Wirtschaftsdienst in Hamburg, for a year and a half. Dr. Krämer will move to Berlin with the greatest dispatch. A number of preliminary drafts, which this writer and Dr. Krämer have produced, will, without special cost, pass into possession of the office so that the first reports can be expected within a few weeks.
Commitments for participation have thus far come from you yourself, Herr Reusch, for you and three other friends from industry (prospectively Herren Vögler, Springorum and von Bohlen) plus Herren von Stauss, Kurt von Schröder (Bankhaus I. H. Stein in Cologne) as well as Herr Rosterg and the undersigned.
May l request that you pay the amount for yourself and your three friends, altogether 12.000 marks, into the account “Dr. Hjalmar Schacht Office” at the Deutsche Bank, central city office, Department A, Berlin.
With best regards,
Yours very sincerely,
Hjalmar Schacht
November 8, 1985
To the Editor:
Herewith my final statement on the controversy brought once again lo the pages of this newsletter by Henry Turner.
The Collapse of the Weimar Republic: Political Economy and Crisis (Princeton, 1981) began with three questions: 1) how did Germany’s divided economic elites attempt to articulate a national agenda around which they could unite? 2) how and from whom was popular support won? 3) how did the institutionalization of social peace first work and then fail? To answer these questions, I explored the factors that generated cooperation between the more dynamic, export-oriented and liberal industrialists and the leaders of organized labor between 1925 and 1930. I tried to demonstrate how the “Weimar System” worked: largely by politicizing the economy. I showed whom it benefitted: employed organized labor, the export industries, and the advocates of a peaceful revision of Versailles. And I examined those compromised by it: part of the Mittelstand, much of’ heavy industry, and most of agriculture.
With the depression, the end of American loans, a severe split over Reparations, and the shrinkage in world trade after 1930, the balance within German industry shifted to more protectionist, labor-intensive and nationalist-conservative industries. The Weimar compromise could no longer hold. Neither labor nor business manifested the readiness to compromise that might have saved the Weimar “System.” No government after 1931 could successfully win popular support and also offer heavy industry a way out of the now unacceptably costly System.
Once capital withdrew from the social compromise that underlay stability, the resulting stalemate proved the source of Weimar’s collapse and provided a political opening for the mass authoritarian populism of the Nazis. The Nazi groundswell was something industrialists had to address, and they were thus faced with the task of choosing among political alternatives not of their own making. Their response was various, inconsistent and contradictory. By mid-1932 most of them could see “no other way out of the crisis” (p. 323) and, “to protect their social dominance,” they “exposed themselves to a potentially uncertain future” (p. 326). By that time, for the dominant industrialists and most agrarians, there was simply no feasible and acceptable alternative to the NSDAP. Why? Because no other force could claim real popular support while also demonstrating a credible commitment to eliminating Weimar’s fragmented political democracy and generous social welfare system.
The dominant fraction of industry wanted “class peace,” and economy “free” to accumulate and generate profits, and a reascendant Germany. The question was not one of volition but, as I wrote, of “how industrialists and estate owners, in light of the Nazis’ independently achieved successes, attempted to insert their interests” (p. 315). In fact, I think industrialists “frequently felt impotent in the face of political developments” (p. 264). But the particular behavior of individual industrialists is an issue I have left to others. I very consciously separated the question of Weimar’s collapse from that of Nazism’s growth and rise to power.
It has been disappointing to say the least, that historians as prolific as Henry Turner and Gerald Feldman have made no effort to engage that discussion and have evaded what thirty-five reviewers in five languages were certain they had read. Instead, they have sought to lend credence to their charges by excoriating some fictive portrayal of “enthusiastic,” “collaborative,” conspirators and a non-existent book, whose “central thesis is that the NSDAP was boosted into power through a joint decision of the dominant factions” of business.
In fact, I argued that the Nazis may have been inadequate and disappointing in many respects and threatening and disturbing in others, but they were the only real alternative. Just as industrialists—without any enthusiasm—collectively compromised with the Socialists in 1918 in order to maintain what was theirs, so by 1932 they did the same with the National Socialists!
* * *
The documents reprinted here clearly demonstrate that point. In the passage quoted by Turner I cited three letters, along with a fourth in the exchange which contains several of the phrases that appear in my book but not in the letters reprinted here. Due to hurried notetaking, my transcriptions were inaccurate—as I have acknowledged in the exchanges and for which I have apologized to readers.1 In particular, I mistook a second Reusch reply to Schacht (September 21, 1932) for part of his first. In that second reply Reusch writes of instances of [Nazi] tactlessness” that contributed to his current disappointment with the Nazis, toward whom he had been “in complete sympathy [durchaus sympatisch gegenüberstand].”
These businessmen perceived the necessity of dealing with the Nazis and doing so to mutual advantage. It was a productive, if risky, opportunity. Why else did Reusch agree “fully and completely [voll und ganz]” with Schacht’s proposal? Why else Schacht’s desire to “assure, as far as possible, that the policy conceptions emerging from the bureau be in harmony [in Einklang] with those views represented from the National Socialist side” by Hitler’s two appointees? (Letters of March 20 and June 6, 1932.) Immediately following what Turner here reproduces, I offered my conclusion to this passage {which Turner does not reproduce). I wrote:
“It was part of the strength of the NSDAP that, until it took power and was compelled to make policy, it propagated a very dexterous and clever mixture of conservative capitalist and populist anticapitalist positions. Compared to its generally pleasing military-diplomatic and racial positions, its economic program remained ambiguous. One should not, therefore, assume that the industrialists’ efforts at ‘enlightenment’ were bound to bear fruit; the point is that they considered this the necessary and most promising avenue.” (pg. 320- 1)
The documents printed here in their correct form substantiate the conclusions I drew from them. Ultimately, however, to assess the adequacy of our respective positions, Turner and I would have to assume each other’s good faith and explore our points of disagreement more fully. It will not do to level the charge of “systematically tendentious” against me or an entire diverse school of historical scholarship. The analytic and interpretive challenge presented by my work has been taken up by many of’ our colleagues. And while I have acknowledged and corrected mistakes in my book, Feldman and Turner have yet to join the discussion.
David Abraham
New School for Social Research
Note
- By now there has been nearly 200 pages of debate, in which these letters and their meaning have figured prominently. In that debate, Turner’s insinuation of “many dozens” such errors is definitively refuted. See: Turner, T.W. Mason, and myself in the AHR 88 (1983): 1142-49; the debate between Feldman and myself, twice each, in Central European History 17 (1984): 159-290; Ulrich Nocken, “Weimarer Geschichte(n) in the Vierteljahrschrift Für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 71 (1984): 505-27, and my “Business Wars,” VSWG 72 (1985): 329-52. Once open critical discussion was accepted, there was nothing “slow” about it.
All but one of the scholarly pieces (including documentation) arc in English and entirely accessible to readers. The intelligence and discrimination of colleagues and readers deserve to be trusted. Those interested will take the time. Far from fearing discussion, I have circulated offprints of these exchanges very widely among colleagues.
(The Schacht-Reusch letters were also excerpted, with Turner’s view presented, in stories in the New York Times, December 23, 1984, pp. 1, 35 and the Chronicle of Higher Education, February 6, 1985, pp. 1, 8, 9. Still further discussion beyond those 200 pages took place in the Radical History Review 32 (1985): 75-96. A number of other pieces appeared in a range of publications, including: the euphemistically named Journal of Historical Review 5 (1984): 440-44, Capital (Bonn) 5/85 and the Wall Street Journal, January 25, 1985, all favoring Feldman and Turner; and The Nation, February 16, 1985, The New Statesman, May 3, 1985 and Die Neue Gesellschaft (Bonn), all favoring me. The most recent piece appeared in the New York Review, September 26, 1985. I am certain there were others I have left out.) [↩]
