This symposium, held at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY on October 20- 23, I987, is part of a broader joint project on Soviet-American Relations and the History of the Second World War, cosponsored by the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the American Council of Learned Societies, and administered in the United States by the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX). It is the second in the series of symposia on the history of World War II, had as its theme the events of mid-1942 through autumn 1943. Specific topics ranged from military events on the Russian front to images of the Soviet Union in American media.
As with the first symposium, held in Moscow in October 1986, the underlying themes were the Second Front issue in its broadest sense and the seemingly contradictory fact of effective Soviet American cooperation. Both delegations remained fascinated with the ways in which the two nations could simultaneously quarrel and cooperate. In addition, we continued to gain a much deeper understanding of what historical is sues most animate our Soviet counterparts. As in the first symposium, we were struck by their nationalistic pride about Soviet military accomplishments (although they admitted that recent US histories seemed to pay much more attention to those achievements), and by their lack of sympathy for American military problems as they related to the opening of a front in western Europe and to the Pacific theater.
I should point out that we had a balance of new participants and people who participated in the previous symposium, an arrangement that served us well since it meant new viewpoints were introduced without our having to start our discussions from scratch. The Soviet delegation included younger scholars as well as a woman, who made a point of expressing her pleasure that each group had included a female historian.
Once again, we were a bit disappoint ed at the relative failure of the Soviet papers to analyze and question Soviet policy. Soviet historians continued to display a “rally ’round the flag” approach during public forums. Private conversations occasionally brought out criticisms of Soviet policies, but that is hardly a substitute for open scholarly debate. One good sign was that Soviet historians, when confronted with a hard question about Soviet policy formulation, this time often countered with the admission that they could not answer since they, had no access to the archives. However, no such statements appeared in their formal papers. Nevertheless, we did encounter repeated indications that Soviet historians were thinking about those kinds of issues.
The most striking evidence of such thinking came when the Soviets request ed a change in the schedule in order to present a discussion of perestroika as it affected the study of history. Although we now realize that such displays of glas’nost have, in the last year, become de rigueur at Soviet-American academic conferences, that does not lessen their impact or diminish our hopes that these words will be translated into reality. (The quotes and notes that follow are taken largely from the summary of the conference submitted by our excellent rapporteur, Ed Bennett.) One senior Soviet historian said “we are trying to examine the white [blank?] spots in Soviet history.” He went on to claim that the archives are more open and that they are trying to make more documentary material available.
Both Soviet and American history textbooks misinterpret and distort each other’s history. This must be corrected. (Two Soviet historians sardonically commented that they are getting two hours less sleep each night because now they are actually reading Pravda and lsvestia, whereas previously they simply threw them in the waste-basket.) Another Soviet historian told of once being forced to excise a statement he wrote arguing that Khrushchev had tried to improve Soviet-American relations. He criticized that as the sort of thing that should not happen. A senior Soviet historian said that they are very defensive about the events of 1939. At the same time, some Soviet historians spoke in terms that can only be described as “reluctant” and even “Thermidorian.” A number of younger Soviet historians addressed the very real problem of reshaping attitudes and coming to grips with change; a difficult task, they said, for bureaucrats. It was the unanimous opinion of the Americans present that the Soviet historians honestly believed that major changes were in the making. For a group of prestigious Soviet historians to admit or even infer that much of what they had written was incomplete and even wrong, that their work was based on inadequate access to their archives, and subject to political censorship, is remarkable.
A Soviet decision to publish in the Soviet Union many of the American papers from the first symposium may also be a glimmer of glas’nost. In addition, a number of those papers, both Soviet and US, will be published in the United States sometime in 1989.
The third symposium, which will deal with the conferences at Moscow, Cairo, and Teheran (to the eve of the Normandy invasion), is scheduled for the Soviet Union sometime in October 1988. As before, we will concentrate on broad issues of Soviet-American relations and Soviet-American perceptions of each other. Discussions of military history, which the Soviets seem to prefer, will continue to be subordinated to large issues of strategy. The list of tentative topics for that meeting includes strategic logistics, planning for postwar re construction, issues of public opinion, postwar Germany, and historiography.
Warren F. Kimball
Rutgers University