Schultz Called Upon to Improve Conditions for Scholarly Research

The following letter to Secretary of State George Shultz reflects the last meeting of the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation chaired by Ernest R. May, American Historical Association member. Two other committee members, John Gaddis and Carol S. Gruber, also represent the AHA. The letter was sent to Shultz on December 21, 1983.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In other countries and here at home as well, the history of American foreign policy after World War II is poorly understood. The Department is partly to blame, for it has withheld from serious scholars the sources necessary for writing fair and comprehensive histories. The interests of scholars have been confused with the interests of journalists and others seeking sensitive information about current issues. As a result, more and more of the history consists merely of remembered headlines, for scholars cannot see the documents which would enable them to correct the record. For practical purposes, this generalization applies at present to the whole period since about 1950. Our collective national interests will be served if you takc some modest steps to improve conditions for scholarly research.

Specifically, we recommend the following:

1. You should establish immediately a policy of opening for scholarly research almost all Department records twenty-five years old or older. If instituted in 1984, that would make possible immediate research on most of the Eisenhower years. Materials for the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations would become available between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, those for the Nix­on, Ford, and Carter Administrations during the subsequent decade. Serious research on the Reagan Administration could commence in about the year 2006. Apart from specifying categories of records to be exempted, such as personnel files and documents potentially compromising intelligence sources and methods, you should set up a procedure for identifying and withholding materials which might for special reasons need to be protect­ed for more than twenty-five years; but the presumption should be in favor of opening the records. The requirements for making exceptions should be exacting.
2. You should lead an effort to make such a policy government wide for the records which permit full reconstruction of the his­tory of American foreign policy are not exclusively products or property of the Department of State.
3. To facilitate research in newly opened materials, to help identify records which might need special handling, and to accelerate the process of correcting the record, you should charge the Historian of the Department to continue producing the comprehensive and immensely valuable Foreign Relations series, to get into print and public circulation as rapidly as possible his already edited volumes for the early and mid-1950s, to com­mence publication of volumes for the late 1950s and early 1960s, and to institute as new supplements several-volume documentary collections on important or much-discussed topics such as the Vietnam War, Soviet-American relations, NATO affairs, or relations with the American Republics. The Foreign Relations volumes per se should continue to be reflective of the whole record, with any necessary omissions specifically identified so that the international scholarly community can retain confidence in the integrity of the series. The new supplements, on the other hand, would in their nature be selective and partial. They would not be expected to provide a basis for genuine scholarship. but they could permit teaching on the history of American foreign policy and foreign relations to be based on some authentic doc­uments other than   those that came to light when the particular issue or relationship happened  to be front page news.
4. You should enlarge this Advisory Committee to include members designated by the chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs committees. In seeing that historical record is fully studied and understood, the legislative and executive branches have a common interest. Congressional participation in the Advisory Committee would help members of the former understand more fully the difficulties involved in providing full access to historical records, the extent to which contemporary reportage and investigation can provide only a partial picture of reality, and, not least, the value of, and justification for expenditure on, the Foreign Relations series and other documentary publications of the Historical Office.

We should add that these recommenda­tions do not intend or imply criticism either of the Historical Office or of the Classification/Declassification Center. We cannot praise too highly the work which the Office has done in the past, the current state of cooperation between the Office and the Cen­ter, and the high quality of the leadership in both. Our recommendations to you have the objective of enabling the Office and the Center to continue to work effectively in condi­tions which increase the pressures upon them by at least one order of magnitude. The Foreign Relations series and the program of support for declassification by National Ar­chives personnel are largely responsible for our being able to say that the period 1945-1950 is coming to be understood as history. But the Foreign Relations series for 1950 be­came complete in 1981. With the series for 1951 still incomplete and files for the first half of the 1950s only very selectively open for research, it seems clear to us that the existing system could produce results comparable to those of the past only if, and perhaps not even if, the Office or the Center were given massive new resources. We therefore believe that a more practical course of action is that outlined in our recommendations.

Though current international problems necessarily preoccupy you, you are well aware that intelligent public and congres­sional understanding of history is a precondi­tion for sound and effective national policies. If you feel any hesitancy about acting on our recommendations, we would welcome an opportunity to see you and to explain why we feel so strongly that these are the steps most likely to bring about the desired result.