The Historian’s Dilemma

In an essay titled “The Causes of the Civil War: A Note on Historical Senti­mentalism,” Arthur Schlesinger, jr. ob­served, “History is not a redeemer, promising to solve all human prob­lems.” In the same paragraph he said, “We cannot therefore be relieved from the duty of moral judgment” on “appall­ing” and “inescapable” issues.

Schlesinger was writing about histori­ans and their treatment of human slav­ery. Yet he put his finger on precisely the dilemma historians experience in their treatment of women’s search for economic justice.

More than fifteen years ago the US government brought a suit against Sears, Roebuck and Company in federal court. The EEOC charge was discrimi­nation on the basis of sex. The case was one of a series involving compensation for women’s labor; important because it would affect the earning capabilities of hundreds of thousands of women em­ployees, and, more so, in its focus on fundamental employment policies in the private sector. Even though in the I960s courts had begun to deal with issues of sex discrimination in public and quasi-public spheres, they had worked out no legal guidelines for pri­vate spheres.

Because of expert opinions given in the case EEOC brought against Sears, disagreements arose in the scholarly community over opposing testimonies given by two women historians.

The philosophies at issue in the Sears case and the interpretations on which the historians differed centered on women’s historical roles. One historian contended that women have demon­strated they prefer pay and opportuni­ties just as they are. Another submitted that society’s demands on women’s time and sex-typing job entrance qualifica­tions have denied women needed and desired earning power.

When the National Coordinating Committee on Women in the Historical Profession and the Conference Group in Women’s History met in New York in December 1985, an apparent conflict in loyalties surfaced. Some members feared the opinions of one of their col­leagues would exert unfavorable influ­ence over the earning powers of needy women. Accordingly, a small group of nine historians presented a resolution censuring the historian who had sug­gested that women have felt satisfied with their pay and their opportunities. The membership discussed the resolu­tion  and  decided not to act on it. It never even came to a vote; clearly, it would have failed.

The next day other resolutions did pass. In recognition of the complexity of historians’ responsibilities, a new, con­siderably tempered and expanded reso­lution came to the floor. The new ac­ceptable resolution consisted of three sections:

1. We, the members of the Co­ordinating Committee of Women in the Historical Profession (CCWHP) and the Conference Group in Women’s History (CGWH) assembled at the 100th Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association (AHA) are deeply concerned by certain cir­cumstances and issues raised in the 1984–85 trial of a 1979 Equal Economic Opportunity Commis­sion (EEOC) case against Sears and Roebuck. In this trial a num­ber of women’s history experts were asked to testify on Sears’ behalf, but only one accepted. Thus, a respected scholar but­tressed Sears’ defense against charges of sex discrimination un­der Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. We urge the members of CCWHP and CGWH, as well as other women’s historians and women’s studies scholars, to in­form themselves about the details of this case and to consider the responsibilities we have incurred by virtue of the growing achieve­ments and recognition of feminist scholarship. Therefore we urge attention to the following ques­tions:
   1. What responsibility do femi­nist scholars bear to the women’s movement?
   2. Would it be appropriate to seek to define a set of ethical prin­ciples for feminist scholarship and its use similar to those accepted by other professional organizations?
   3. What is the relationship of the ideology of domesticity to women’s position in the paid labor force?
2. We believe that as scholars we may have many differing inter­pretations of the sources in wom­en’s history and we reject the claims of anyone to be representing a “true interpretation” of women’s history.
3. We believe as feminist schol­ars we have a responsibility not to allow our scholarship to be used against the interests of women struggling for equity in our society.

Six months later on June 6, 1986, Samuel G. Freedman, a New York Times reporter, wrote a piece titled “Of His­tory and Politics: Bitter Feminist De­bate.” Freedman quoted unfavorably only the third section of the resolution that passed. Thus, he dismissed the work the scholars did in the two prior sections, and he produced a simplistic assessment of a complex matter. He distorted the truth. The truth is the historians at the New York meeting rec­ognized both the moral and profession­ al dimensions of their actions.

Nevertheless, a Washington Post edito­rial writer also quoted, and without ac­knowledgement, the same third section of the resolution that had appeared  in the Freedman piece. In remarks head­ lined “Misusing History,” the editorial writer failed to mention Section I and Section II, thereby ignoring the crucial statement: “We believe that as scholars we may have many differing interpreta­tions of the sources in women’s history and we reject the claims of anyone to be representing a ‘true interpretation’ of women’s history.” Instead the editorial writer accused CCWHP/CGWH of con­ spiring to “apply, blindly, a party line”; in effect, he or she accused CCWHP/CGWH of muzzling dissent.

The historians of CCWHP/CGWH believe that the New York Times and the Washington Post presented their resolu­tion unfairly. They feel that they were muzzled when letters to editors rebut­ ting the articles were not printed in either paper.

Both newspaper writers, and others who followed their lead, created a false impression that CCWHP/CGWH de­nied freedom of speech and  opinion  to a colleague. No such denial occurred. Instead, the women and men historians who participated in the New York meet­ing took seriously the professional insight of Schlesinger’s essay: “History is not a redeemer, promising to solve all human problems.” They believed, how­ ever, that historical study can direct attention, that it can throw light. For these reasons they set forth  questions for everyone’s consideration in Section I of their resolution.

The historians also took seriously Schlesinger’s position that “We cannot therefore be relieved from the duty of moral judgment” on “appalling” and “inescapable” issues. For this reason they set forth in Section III their sense that their scholarship has revealed mor­al obligations and that these obligations relate to the human rights of women.

This is how this group approached the historian’s dilemma. Such dilemmas arise whenever intense study of the past convinces the scholar that flagrant viola­tions of human rights persist. Like ev­eryone else, historians must participate in the events of their lifetimes. Earnest­ly, the historians desired economic jus­tice for women. Deeply, they desired to support their disadvantaged sisters. Just as earnestly, they desired to affirm the great gains of civil rights. In Section II they explicitly intended, even as they expressed their beliefs about the Sears case, to protect the right to dissent.

Historians can only hope that the in­tegrity of their work eventually will arouse people of the twentieth century and centuries to come, as the work of French and American Enlightenment writers aroused the people of the eigh­teenth century. For historians it’s a long road to salvation. But they must travel it.